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Andrey Feuerverger (2008) is to be congratulated on having given us such
a careful analysis of a very interesting data set. He has obviously gone to
great efforts to understand the archaeology (in several languages) and back-
ground of the tomb in question, and the literature and history surrounding
it. This effort is exactly what a modern statistician should be doing in an
applied problem.
Unfortunately Feuerverger is hampered, in my view, by his predisposition
toward sampling theory. His technique relies on his RR-values (“relevance
and rareness”), but he gives no theory of RR. Just what is it? What justifies
multiplying them together? What have you got when you’re done? Second,
his method computes the probability of data as or more extreme than that
observed were the null hypothesis true, which violates the likelihood princi-
ple because it counts as relevant data that did not occur. Finally, his method
is very limited in the conclusions it permits one to draw: either the null hy-
pothesis is false or something unusual has happened. Well, which is it? Using
his paradigm, he is unable even to give a probability of which of these is the
case. A great deal of effort goes into establishing a conclusion whose form
does not address the question of interest, at least as I interpret it.
By contrast, a Bayesian treatment has clear-cut and simple rules. These
have been worked out extensively for problems in forensic science; indeed the
present problem can be so regarded. The question, as Feuerverger himself
points out, is to calculate P (B |A)/P (B |A) where A is the event that the
Talpiyot tomb is that of theNT family, and A is that it is not. The event B is
the evidence we have, namely the specific names found in Talpiyot. P (B |A)
is probability of this tomb arising if it were the tomb of the NT family.
Thus it involves what other renditions of names might have been used for
the persons in the NT family, and the possible identities of the unidentified
persons in the tomb. Similarly P (B | A), which is essentially what he is
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computing from the onomasticon, is the probability of this configuration
arising from some other family or group of people. While he says that this
specification of B is “awkward to work with,” it seems to me that it leads
us to address the essential questions in analyzing the Talpiyot tomb.
Ho¨fling and Wasserman (2008) and Ingermanson (2008) in preceding com-
ments on the paper give differing Bayesian analyses of this problem, and
Mortera and Vicard (2008) stated how they would use DNA analysis in one.
Should we be disturbed that the former two make different assumptions, and
derive different posterior probabilities? I would argue not. The strength of
the Bayesian approach is that it requires the assumptions to be stated ex-
plicitly and argued for. The acceptability of those assumptions is for each
reader to judge for himself or herself. All the Bayesian argument ensures
is that each writer is coherent, that is, does not contain internal contradic-
tions in a certain technical sense. Thus the Bayesian view of probability is
arguably like a language. That a sentence is in grammatical English does
not require the reader to agree with it; proper grammar only helps us to
understand what the writer means. Similarly, an opinion expressed in prob-
abilistic terms is explicit, that is, a reader can understand what the writer’s
view is, but it is up to the writer to be persuasive to the reader. Each reader,
then, needs to state the beliefs found most congenial, and to compute his or
her own posterior probability accordingly.
Finally, it is obviously necessary to say something about how the statis-
tical analysis of this data set relates to the religious beliefs of many people.
Fortunately there is no contradiction between the Bayesian paradigm and
such beliefs. Bayes Theorem in odds form reads, as Feuerverger points out,
P (A |B)
P (A |B)
=
P (A)
P (A)
×
P (B |A)
P (B |A)
.
Here the factor P (A)/P (A) is the prior odds of the event A. For those whose
religious beliefs specify P (A) = 0 and P (A) = 1 (i.e., there is no chance that
the tomb is that of the NT family), whatever the likelihood contribution
[here P (B |A)/P (B |A)], the posterior odds of A [here P (A |B)/P (A |B)]
are zero. This set of beliefs is coherent in the technical sense (i.e., it does
not lead to sure loss), and hence is fully consistent with the Bayesian view.
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